Abstract: There is a growing interest in retaining and analyzing metadata. Motivated by this trend, the dissertation studies the potential for surveillance via the Domain Name System, an important infrastructure service on the Internet. Three fingerprinting techniques are developed and evaluated. The first technique allows a resolver to infer the URLs of the websites a user visits by matching characteristic patterns in DNS requests. The second technique allows to determine operating system and browser of a user based on behavioral features. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is demonstrated that the activities of users can be tracked over multiple sessions, even when the IP address of the user changes over time. In addition, the dissertation considers possible countermeasures. Obfuscating the desired hostnames by sending a large number of dummy requests (so-called range queries), turns out to be less effective than believed so far. Therefore, more appropriate techniques (mixing queries, pushing popular queries, and extended caching of results) are proposed in the thesis. The results raise awareness for an overlooked threat that infringes the privacy of Internet users, but they also contribute to the development of more usable and more effective privacy enhancing technologies.
Introduction
The focus of the dissertation [5] is the Domain Name System (DNS), an important infrastructure service that acts as an address book on the Internet. For instance, the domain www.bundestag.de is associated with the IP address 217.79.215.140. The DNS translates the domain name (short: the domain) into the respective IP address, which is used to route data packets to their destination on the Internet. This so-called name resolution is carried out by special DNS servers (recursive nameservers or just resolvers), which are provided by Internet service providers such as T-Online.
When the DNS was developed 30 years ago, availability was the primary design goal. The currently ongoing deployment of DNSSEC focuses on integrity and authenticity. However, the protection of confidentiality is not addressed at all. Everyone seems to be willing to accept that DNS resolvers learn all the domains resolved by their users (see Figure 1 ).
However, confidentiality is becoming more important in the DNS due to two recent developments. Firstly, there is a trend toward centralization of name resolution. Global players such as Google, OpenDNS, and Symantec have started to offer publicly available DNS servers for free in the last years. The nameservers of third-party vendors offer better quality of service (in terms of performance, resilience, and integrity protection) than the DNS servers of many Internet service providers.
Therefore, it is not surprising that third-party servers are increasing in popularity. In 2012 the public DNS servers of Google answered more than 70 billion queries per day [2] . According to studies, about 3% of all users have migrated to a third-party server so far. Potential privacy infringements via DNS have not received much attention so far.
The second development concerns the growing importance of metadata for criminal investigations. DNS server of Internet service providers as well as servers offered by third party providers could play an important role here. Law enforcement agencies could easily seize DNS query protocols, which are typically retained on resolvers for a short period of time for debugging purposes. In compari- 
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Using a third-party DNS resolver DNS resolver of Internet service provider son to the entire IP traffic, DNS traffic needs only a fraction of space: The DNS queries make up only about 0.05% of the total traffic volume. In addition, an analysis of retained DNS query protocols allows investigators to gain information about suspects in hindsight. However, there is the risk of misinterpretations, because the evidential value of DNS queries has not been studied so far.
The extent and effectiveness of monitoring Internet users by analyzing their DNS queries are hardly quantifiable today. Furthermore, there is a lack of practical tools that can be used to protect DNS users from undesired surveillance. The dissertation sets out to close these gaps via empirical studies and prototypical implementations.
The thesis shows what information can be reconstructed from DNS queries and how effective countermeasures can be designed. This paper summarizes the six main findings: (1) a fingerprinting technique that allows to infer visited websites, (2) a fingerprinting technique to infer the operating system and browser of a user, (3) a behavior-based tracking technique to link multiple sessions of a user, (4) an analysis of the effectiveness of DNS range queries, (5) the DNSMIX anonymity service, and (6) various countermeasures against behavior-based tracking.
Monitoring capabilities of DNS servers
This section summarizes the findings that aim to assess the effectiveness of surveillance via the Domain Name System. These findings are mostly of empirical nature.
Inference of visited websites (Finding 1)
The first question considered in the dissertation is: To what extent can DNS service providers monitor their users, i. e., can they determine what websites their users visit? So far it has been believed that this is far from trivial. First, DNS clients send only the domain name to the DNS resolver, but not the whole web address (URL) of the desired site. For instance, when a user visits http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIDS, the resolver is only aware of the fact that the browser wants to connect to the web server de.wikipedia.org. In many cases (like in this example) the domain does not reveal much about the intention of a user. Second, one cannot immediately conclude from observing a DNS request for some domain, that a user has actually visited the associated website. Each time a website is retrieved by the browser, a multitude of DNS queries for various domains is generated, because websites include content and files from multiple web servers and third parties. Moreover, modern browsers resolve some domains in the background to improve responsiveness. For this pre-emptive name resolution ("DNS Prefetching") the browser resolves the domains of all links that are included in a website, so that it already knows the IP address when a user eventually clicks on one of those links.
The results shown in the dissertation question this reasoning. In particular, the dissertation examines two approaches that allow DNS service providers to overcome the two issues mentioned above. The first approach consists of heuristics, the second is a fingerprinting technique. Both approaches are studied with an exemplary case study that contains the DNS queries of a short surfing session (10 minutes, 11 visited websites).
It is shown that a DNS resolver can employ straightforward rule-based heuristics to infer the domains of a visited website in 10 out of the 11 cases. For this purpose the resolver has to analyze the DNS traffic and select only those queries that match the conditions "inter-arrival time between two consecutive DNS queries < 2 s" and "domain starts with www.". While surprisingly effective (high recall), these heuristics are not perfect (in terms of precision): They generate a number of false positives, i. e., domains that have not been visited by the user. Moreover, the resolver only learns the domain part of the visited URLs.
The second approach is a website fingerprinting technique and is motivated by the hypothesis that the re- trieval of a website can be inferred from its query pattern, i. e., the set of domains that have to be resolved so that the website can be displayed in the browser. Modeling the query pattern as a set neglects the order of queries and their timing. This allows the matching to tolerate small changes introduced by network delays during transmission. A prerequisite for this approach is that the DNS resolver possesses a query pattern database with the patterns of all websites of interest. The task of inferring a visited website is then reduced to matching short sequence of DNS traffic to all patterns in the database and picking the pattern with the largest intersection. The effectiveness of the fingerprinting technique is evaluated using four datasets: the homepages of 100 000 popular websites according to the Alexa Toplist ranking, the 5000 most popular entries from Wikipedia, 5000 randomly picked entries from Wikipedia, and about 6300 news from the popular German technology website heise.de. For each website the resolved domains were recorded while it was downloaded with a web browser. After all data had been collected, the -identifiability value was calculated for each website. The value of is the number of websites in the dataset that have the same query pattern, i. e., that can not be identified unambiguously with the fingerprinting approach. Table 1 shows the fraction of websites in each dataset that are 1-identifiable as well as the fraction of websites that are no more than 5-identifiable. The results indicate that visits to the majority of the considered websites can be inferred with website fingerprinting. Popular Wikipedia entries can be identified more often than randomly chosen entries because popular entries typically come with a large number of "related links" at the bottom of the page, which are prefetched by the browser, creating a very characteristic pattern.
Inference of operating system and browser (Finding 2)
Apart from inferring which websites a user visits, the operator of a resolver may also be able to determine the type of operating system and browser used for surfing the web. This knowledge can be used to mount targeted attacks that rely on social engineering or to exploit vulnerabilities found in the software used by a user. A straightforward approach consists in looking out for domain names that are resolved when programs query their vendors' servers for software updates. Most vendors use telling domain names that disclose operating system and browser to the resolver, for instance windowsupdate.com and aus3.mozilla.org. The dissertation presents the results of experiments with commonly used operating systems (Windows XP/7/8, MacOS X, and three Linux distributions) and browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Safari, and Internet Explorer). As expected, most of them can be identified with this kind of analysis.
More interesting is the result that the absence of telling domain names does not prevent a resolver from inferring operating system and browser. This is because RFC 1034 and 1035 do not standardize the name resolution process in detail. As a result, DNS client implementations from different vendors exhibit slightly different behavior, which can be exploited for the purpose of inference.
In particular, error handling procedures have shown to be a useful source of information. Characteristic properties are the number of retries and the waiting time before a DNS client resends a query that has not been answered by the resolver in a timely manner (cf. Table 2 ). In addition, the reaction to NXDOMAIN errors, invalid domains, and type AAAA queries for IPv6 addresses can be used for differentiation. Experiments show that all considered operating systems and browsers are subject to this kind of inference attack.
Behavior-based tracking for user re-identification (Finding 3)
The previous two findings suggest that the operators of DNS resolvers can learn a good deal about their users and This common belief has to be questioned in the light of the following findings. In particular, the dissertation shows how to build a behavior-based tracking technique that allows a resolver to link the surfing sessions of a user even when dynamically assigned IP addresses are used. The technique is based on two hypotheses, firstly, that human users have a characteristic set of interests that causes them to visit specific websites, and secondly, that users follow established daily routines on the Internet. If these two assumptions hold, a resolver can analyze the DNS traffic using off-the-shelf classification techniques from the machine learning domain to re-identify users based on their behavior in the past.
Results from related work indicate that the set of visited websites does indeed exhibit characteristic features. However, so far no one has studied whether singular sessions contain sufficiently distinguishing features. For instance, Yang's technique, which is based on association rule mining, achieves a re-identification accuracy of 62% with 100 users -but only if there are 200 training sessions available for each user [12] . Therefore, it is unknown whether singular user sessions can be linked at all.
This question motivated a large-scale experiment. In cooperation with the computing center of a German university, the DNS queries of all users on campus and the student dormitories have been recorded over a period of five months. User privacy was protected by applying a keyed hash function to the IP addresses of the users. The secret key was not disclosed to us and discarded after the data collection. While this procedure ensures privacy, it also represents each user with a unique and constant pseudonym, because users are assigned static IP addresses in the campus network. Thus, the resulting dataset contains the ground truth for all sessions, which enables us to evaluate the correctness of the re-identification predictions.
For behavior-based re-identification, each user session is converted into a vector. Each element of the vector corresponds to one particular domain name. The value of an element equals the number of queries the user issued in a specific session for this domain.
A notable feature of the developed re-identification technique is its optimization for fluctuating user groups, which is missing in previous work, but of high importance in a practical deployment. In order to allow for repeatability of experiments and reproducibility of results, the re-identification technique has been embedded into an automated evaluation framework, which simplifies and speeds up the analysis process. The software has been implemented in Java for the MapReduce platform Apache Hadoop, which allows parallel execution on compute clusters. The source code is available at http://github. com/hadoop-dns-tracking/. Details about the dataset, the methodology as well as initial results have been published in [7, 10] .
According to the results, behavior-based reidentification with singular sessions is feasible: Given 12 015 active users, the classification engine achieves an accuracy of 76% when all sessions are to be linked on a day-to-day basis over the course of two months. Even rather simple classifiers, for instance 1-nearest neighbor with cosine similarity and Multinomial Naïve Bayes, are surprisingly effective here. Of interest is also the finding that there are 273 immediately identifying domains. Each of these domains is only resolved by a single user in the dataset, but in each and every of his/her sessions, which allows for immediate re-identification of all of their sessions. These and other results stress that -contrary to common beliefs -dynamically IP addresses should not be relied upon for online privacy.
Notably, behavior-based tracking is not limited to DNS only. It is also of interest for advertising networks that track web users so that they can serve tailored ads to them. What is worrisome about this technique is the fact that it can be carried out entirely passively, i. e., in contrast to setting HTTP cookies or browser fingerprinting, it cannot be detected on the client side. Therefore, apart from studying defensive techniques that prevent unwanted monitoring of DNS users, the dissertation also specifically looks into defenses against behavior-based tracking (cf. Finding 6).
Techniques for self-defense
This section covers the constructive contributions of the dissertation that aim to protect the privacy of DNS users.
Analysis of range queries (Finding 4)
Previous work by Zhao et al. proposed to obfuscate the resolved domains by submitting a large number of dummy queries for arbitrary domain names together with each actual query [13] . This so-called range query approach has been believed to be quite effective so far. However, further experiments demonstrate that a resolver can leverage website fingerprinting (cf. Finding 1) to infer the actually visited website -even when range queries are used [11] . When a domain is obfuscated by sending 9 additional dummy queries, about 94% of the considered websites can be inferred; for 99 dummies the resolver still achieves an accuracy of 91%.
This result can be explained via stochastic analysis. When dummy domains are drawn entirely randomly (as proposed in previous work), it is extremely unlikely that the resulting sets of domains, which are sent out consecutively to the resolver, contain more than one plausible query pattern.
Based on this observation an improved range query scheme is proposed. The improved scheme requires the DNS client to be equipped with a database of plausible query patterns. The client can then ensure that the constructed range queries consist of plausible query patterns only, which prevents website fingerprinting. However, this approach is somewhat cumbersome and thus may be considered impractical.
DNSMIX anonymity service (Finding 5)
The DNSMIX anonymity service [4] implements another approach to protect privacy. It integrates a classical mix cascade, which offers anonymity, with a push component, which provides unobservability. The push component exploits the power law that governs browsing behavior of humans, i. e., the vast majority of DNS queries relates to a rather small set of overly popular domains. The push component transmits the IP addresses of a set of popular domains to each connected client in bulk and provides a continuous streams of updates. The feasibility of this idea was assessed by pushing the most popular 10 000 domains, which attracted 84% of all queries (cf. Figure 2) , to a group of 2000 users. In the experiment, the stream of updates amounted to 0.8 KB/s per user, which is affordable in a typical scenario.
Pushing IP addresses to users has two benefits: First, users can resolve popular domains without any delay, and more importantly, resolving those domains becomes unobservable for the DNS resolver. Queries for less popular domains are transmitted over the second component of DNSMIX, a cascade of multiple anonymizing mixes that hide the information which user has sent which query [1] . As the mixes are tailored for DNS queries they outperform the general-purpose Tor [3] anonymization system. An alternative to employing a classical mix network is the EncDNS system [9] , which repurposes the conventional DNS resolver (the one that is provided by the ISP) as a proxy server.
Preventing user re-identification (Finding 6)
Like other privacy enhancing technologies, DNSMIX requires users to install client-side software on their machines, which is a barrier to widespread adoption. A pragmatic direction of research is to devise lightweight anonymity solutions that offer a better trade-off between protection and usability. The dissertation studies lightweight techniques that specifically protect against behavior-based tracking. One approach to prevent behavior-based tracking consists in extending the duration of caching in the client, i. e., ignoring the TTL value given by authoritative nameservers. Thus, repetitive queries to a given domain name can be resolved locally and unobservably by the client, which should make the behavioral vectors less characteristic. Experiments show that this measure would be quite effective: Enforcing a minimum caching duration of 24 hours reduces the re-identification accuracy by roughly 50%. However, IP addresses in the cache may be invalid when they are used after a long time, resulting in network connectivity problems.
More promising is to increase the frequency of IP address changes. Shorter sessions contain less information and are thus more difficult to link to each other. Using a dataset with 3600 concurrent users, the accuracy dropped from 86% (sessions of 24 hours) to 55% for sessions of 60 minutes and to 31% for sessions of 5 minutes.
As of today, most users will have to force their router to reconnect in order to obtain a new IP address, which is quite inconvenient. The ongoing introduction of IPv6 can be seen as a unique opportunity in this regard: Internet service providers could offer their customers much more privacy by default, for instance by assigning multiple IPv6 prefixes to them or by switching IPv6 prefixes very frequently [6] .
Conclusion and impact of results
The presented results remind us that the Domain Name System has not been designed with privacy in mind. In particular, the dissertation shows that DNS resolvers -but also advertising networks -can leverage inference attacks to learn much more about their users than immediately obvious. As users have no means to determine whether their activities are analyzed, their right to informational selfdetermination is at risk. Concerned users will have to take proactive measures to defend their privacy. However, as of today there is no viable technique for self-defense that users can deploy unilaterally on their own. Instead they depend on the availability of anonymity services or their Internet service provider, who may play an important role for improving the overall level of privacy in the future.
The main aim of the dissertation is to raise awareness for inference attacks. However, it should not be forgotten that the presented techniques have a dual-use property, i. e., they can also be used for good purposes. In particular, law enforcement agencies could integrate them into their network forensics toolbox to improve their investigation capabilities [8] .
